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CHARACTERIZATION OF SURVIVAL OF TORT ACTIONS
THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH in conflict of laws cases has been to char-
acterize the particular problem as substantive or procedural and in that
manner to determine which law should govern the case.' The oft-
repeated formula is that matters of procedure are governed by the law
of the forum2 and that matters of substance are governed by the law
of the locus.3 There is probably no concept in the law which has been
more misleading than the supposedly obvious and inexorable distinction
between substance and procedure.' The prevailing and minority
opinions of the Supreme Court of California in the recent case of Grant
v. McAalife are illustrative.5
Suit was brought in a California court against the administrator of
the estate of a California decedent for personal injuries sustained in an
automobile accident which had occurred in Arizona. According to
1 See generally ROBERTSON, CHARACTE IZATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (194o);
Lorenzen, The Qualification, Classification, or Characterization Problem in Conflict of
Laws, 50 YALE L.J. 743 (194.); Cormack, Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and
Preliminary Questions in the Conflict of Laws, 14 So. CALIF. L. REv. 221 (941);
Falconbridge, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 53 L.Q. REV. 235 (1937).
2 The development of the rule that as to matters of procedure the law of the forum
governs is based on necessity and practicality. A limitation on the scope of reference
to foreign law is necessary since it is the judicial machinery of the forum that en-
forces the foreign law. The fact that foreign procedure may be difficult to apply or
would inconvenience and burden the courts of the forum is a reality. See GOODRICH,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8o ( 3 d ed. 1948) 5 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Intro-
duction, c. 12 (934); ix AM. JuR., Conflict of Laws § 186, at 499 (1937); 15
C.J.S., Conflict of Laws § 22, at 948 (1939).
a3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS §584.1, at 16oo; ii AM. JUR., Conflict of Laws
§ 14, at 314 0935).
'In COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 16o, 187
(942) the writer sets out and criticizes decisions wherein the assumption that a par-
ticular word has an invariable meaning was expressed. See also ROBERTSON, op. Cit.
supra note I, at 157-223; CHAMBERLAYNE, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE § 171
(191i), who reasons that "substance" and "procedure" are purely illusory; In Cook,
"Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 344 (1933),
the author formulates the following test for determining whether a problem is sub-
stantive or procedural: "How far can the court go in applying the rules taken from
the foreign system of law without unduly hindering or inconveniencing itself?"; see
Cheatham, Internal Law Distinctions in the Conflict of Laws, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 570,
579 (x916), wherein the author sets forth a somewhat similar convenience test.
r 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953).
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the common law of Arizona, a cause of action for personal injuries does
not survive the death of the tortfeasor 6 California, however, by statute,
had abrogated the common law rule.7 The District Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's application of Arizona law to sustain the de-
fendant's plea in abatement;' but the Supreme Court of California re-
versed the decision, four to three. The majority ruled that the sur-
vival of a tort action was a procedural question for the conflict of laws
purpose and applied the law of the forum.9 The court distinguished a
recent decision in which, in a slightly different setting, it was held that
the question of survival was one of substance.'0 Said Mr. Justice
Traynor:
"'Substance' and 'procedure' . . . are not legal concepts of in-
variable content." Black Diamond Steamship Corp. v. Robert
Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386 ['9491 ... and a statute or other
rule of law will be characterized according to the nature of the
problem for which a characterization must be made."
6 ARIZ. C.A. §§ 21-534 (1939). For the general common law rule as to the sur-
vival of a cause of action for personal injuries, see GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 2,
§ ioi, at 294. 1 C.J.S., Abatement and Revival § 14.3, at 196 (1936).
7CAL. CIV. CODE § 956; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 385, CAL. PROD. CODE § 573
(1949).
8 z25 P.zd 89 (Cal. App. 1953). 'See note 2 supra.
10Cort. v. Steen, 36 Cal.zd 437, 224 P.zd 723 (1950). This was an action for
property and personal injuries against the administrator of the deceased tortfeasor. The
tort had occurred before the enactment of a California statute abrogating the common
law rule abating actions for personal injuries upon the decease of the tortfeasor. All
the contacts of the case were within California. In a four to three decision, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that the survival statute was substantive, and therefore could
not be retroactively applied.
" Compare the various results of the characterization in the following cases:
Black Diamond Steamship Corp. v. Robert Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386 (1949),
wherein the issue of measure of damages resulting from a collision in Belgian terri-
torial waters involving a United States owned vessel was considered procedurali
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), wherein the New York statute of
limitations barring action was characterized as substantive and binding on the federal
court in that state, thereby disallowing derivative action against a trustee for breach
of fiduciary duties; Sampson v. Channell, iso F.2d 754. (ist Cir. 1940), wherein in an
action for personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision in Maine, the federal
court in Massachusetts held that the burden of proving contributory negligence was
determined by a substantive rule and hence that the conflict of laws rule of Massachu-
setts applied. See also COOK, op. cit. supra note 4. In Cook, "Substance,' and "Pro-
cedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 4z YALE L.J. 333, 337 (1933), the author states,
"The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules, and
so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely the same
scope in all of them, runs through all legal discussion. It has all the tenacity of original
sin and must constantly be guarded against." Briefly, this statement typifies the view
of those who believe that no arbitrary rule of characterization is workable. Examples
The dissenters decried the rule set up by the majority as leaving
future decisions to the "untrammeled whimsy" of the court, and
mourned the passing of a "government of laws rather than of men.' 2
Although one might share the misgivings of the minority as to the
rationale of the majority, the outcome of the case seems eminently
"correct." The plaintiffs and decedent were citizens of California5 the
estate of the deceased was being administered therei indeed, the only
contact with Arizona was the happenstance that the accident out of
which the litigation arose occurred there. Instinctively, this is one of
those situations in which the court of the forum ought to apply its
internal law if a legitimate rationale is available.
Characterizing the question of survival of tort liability as "pro-
cedural" was not, however, a satisfactory rationale for this decision.
Whatever may have been the original basis for the notion that survival
goes only to the remedy rather than to the substance of a case, the
idea can no longer be considered acceptable. 3 Whether a plaintiff will
be allowed to recover is not a remedial or procedural matter; it is a
of characterization according to the nature of the problem involved are Tucker v.
Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424 (i9o2), wherein a launched craft, still incomplete, was
held to be a "vessel" in order to give admirality jurisdiction over deserting seamen;
Seabrook v. Raft of Railroad Cross Ties, 40 Fed. 596 (D.S.C. 2889), wherein a raft
of logs was held to be a "vessel" for the purpose of giving a maritime lien for
damages resulting from a collision.
12 264 P.2d 944, 950 (Cal. 1953). The dissenters here were also in the minority
in Cort v. Steen, 36 Cal.zd 437, 440, 224 P.zd 723, 726 (i95o). See note io supra.
It would seem that even through they disagreed with the characterization of survival
of a cause of action for personal injury as substantive in the Cort case, they have sub-
ordinated their convictions in order to promote consistency in the characterization of
survivability. For a criticism of the minority's hope for consistency, see LORENZEN,
SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 11 (1947).
"The majority in the Grant case noted that formerly it had been held that the
question of survival of a tort claim was procedural. 264 P.zd 944, 94.7 (Cal. 1953).
However, after the circulation of the Restatement, Conflict of Laws in i929, the
majority of decisions have characterized the survival of tort claims as substantive.
Hence the law of the place of injury must govern. Undoubtedly, the argument for
uniformity of decision, regardless of the place of the forum, caused reversal of the
prior view. That the law of the place of injury governs survival see 2 BEALE, op.
cit. supra note 3, § 390.; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 2, § 92, at 26o; RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 390 (1934) 5 11 AM. JUR., Conflict of Laws § 78, at 68
(1936) 5 and cases cited by the majority in the Grant case, 264 P. zd 944, 946-947
(Cal. 1953), holding that the survival of a cause of action for personal injuries is a
substantive matter governed by the law of the place where the injury occurred. For a
criticism of the "place of injury" standard see STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 201
(2d ed. x95 ) ; See also Comment, Functional Application of Conflict of Laws Rules
in Tort Cases, 44 YALE LJ. 1233 (1935), suggesting that consideration of the social
purposes behind particular rules of law might serve to bring about more satisfactory
results than would "blind" application of the "place of tort" standard.
19541 NOTES
DUKE BAR JOURNAL
matter of the existence or nonexistence of a right.14 And even though
one does not share the opinion of the minority that the terms "sub-
stance" and "procedure" should have an invariable and definite con-
tent, it is obvious that the manipulation of the terms in which the court
indulged in the present case may lead to embarrassment in future liti-
gation. Suppose, for example, that two Arizona residents collide in
Arizona, one being injured as a result of the negligence of the other.
Suppose, then, that the tortfeasor dies and for some reason the suit
is brought against his administrator in California instead of Arizona.
In such a fact situation, the only contact which California would have
with the case would be that it was the state of the forum, and it is im-
probable that the California court would wish to apply its own law in
preference to that of Arizona. Yet, under the present holding it could
not do otherwise. No matter how manipulable the majority considers
the concepts of procedure and substance, the principle of stare decisis
would not permit characterizing the question as substantive without
flatly overruling the present case.
It is a well settled rule of conflict of laws that in a single-state tort
action the law of the locms delicti governs as to the existence, nature,
and extent of a right. 5 No matter how the foreign forum gives effect
to this right, whether it be according to "comity," 16 the "vested rights"
"See Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 8z, 174 Atl. 5o8 (1934), holding that the right to
sue is substantive5 Dawson v. Dawson, 224 Ala. 13, 138 So. 414 (1931).
"Apparently, and reasonably, in many cases the law of the place of the wrong is
applied because it is the only controlling law where the ,injury occurred. See GooD-
RICH, op. cit. supra note 2, § 92, p. z61. In addition, precedent, treaties, and the full
faith and credit clause, U.S. CONST. ART. IV, § I, have been advanced as arguments
for the application of the law of the place of the wrong. See Cheatham, American
Theories of Conflict of Laws, Their Role and Utility, 58 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1945).
See also LORENZEN, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 362 (4th ed. 1937); RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-379 (1934).
Where the acts leading up to the tort are not confined to one state, a problem arises
as to what law is to govern. Thus, in the case of a multiple state tort problem, applica-
tion of the "place of wrong" standard may not be practical. For recognition of the
difficulties in a multiple state tort situation, see RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 38z and comments (1934); Rheinstein, Place of Wrong, i9 TULANE L. REV. 40930.
"0 The "comity" doctrine, as used in the United States, is attributed to Mr. Chief
Justice Story. See STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (8th ed. 1883). This doctrine is to
the effect that the law of the sovereign is territorial and without legal effect beyond its
boundaries. However, when a foreign-created right is to be enforced, the forum,
recognizing the necessity for having its own rights enforced in a foreign forum when
the occasion requires, will apply the foreign law to the particular adjudication. For
an example of Story's approach, see Hilton v. Guyot, x59 U.S. 113 (.895), where
the United States Supreme Court held that the merits of a French judgment, sought to
be enforced in a United States court, may be re-examined, since a French court would
reappraise the merits of an American judgment sought to be enforced in a French court.
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theory,17 or the "local law" theory 8 selected by the majority in this
case, the result should be the same. Thus, initially, the present de-
cision seems to be unsupportable on any theory.
However, the question here is not of the existence, nature, or extent
of the right, but of the effect of an event which occurred after the com-
mission of the tort, namely the death of the tortfeasor. 9 Conceding
that, absent this fact, the parties should have been governed by the
substantive law of Arizona, it does not follow that California has to
apply the law of Arizona in order to determine the effect of this sub-
sequent event on the original cause of action. Suppose that before the
tortfeasor died he had executed a release in California. It would seem
that the California court would not be obliged to apply the substantive
law of Arizona to determine the effect of this release even though the
17 The "vested rights" theory is attributed to Professor Beale, who thought it in-
conceivable that a foreign law could operate in the forum. See i BEALE, op. cit. supra
note 3, § 8A. 7 , at 63. An illustration of the "vested rights' theory is Slater v.
Mexican Nat. R., 194 U.S. ioz, 126 (i9o4), where Mr. Justice Holmes stated: "The
theory of the foreign suit is that although the act complained of was subject to no
law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an'obligation, an obligation, which like
other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the person
may be found."
" The "local law" theory is a repudiation of the "comity" theory and the "vested
rights" theory. In practice, the right which the forum enforces is one created by the
law of the forum, though modeled on the right existing under the law of the place of
occurrence. An example of the "local law" theory in practice is Guinness v. Hicks,
291 Fed. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), modified, 269 U.S. 71 (1925). (This was a suit to
recover a debt owed by a German citizen where payment was to be made in German
marks, and the issue was whether the value of the marks in dollars as of the date
when the debt matured or the value at the date of the decree was to govern the amount
of recovery. Held, following the "local law" theory, that the value of marks in
dollars as of the date when the stated account became payable measured the amount
of recovery.) Walter Wheeler Cook and Judge Learned Hand are considered as being
responsible for the "local law" theory. Cavers, The "Local Law" Theories, 63
HARv. L. REV. 823 (195o), wherein it is suggested that there are two "local law"
theories. Hand's theory would first require that a right be created by the law of the
locus, after which the forum is to "model" its right. "It is a matter of no concern
(to Cook) whether the foreign state has created a right in the plaintiff under its law.
When the forum finds it appropriate to look to the law of another state it seeks simply
a rule of decision to use in disposing of the case." Id. at 824-825. For a criticism
of the "local law" theory, see de Sloovere, The Local Law Theory and Its Implica-
tions in the Conflict of Laws, 41 HARv. L. REV. 421 (19ZB). For an analysis of
all three theories, see Cheatham, note 4 supra: Dodd, The Powers of the Supreme
Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 HARv. L. REv.
533 (.926).
1 "Under that standard [place of wrong] the effect of death of one of the parties
upon the cause of action is, as has been indicated, determined by reference to the law
of the place of injury, although the fact of death and the question of survivorship have
nothing to do with either the injury or the conduct of the defendant." STUMBERG, op.
c't. :s5:pra not. 13, at zo6.
DUKE BAR JOURNAL [Vol. 4
tort occurred in Arizona.2 ° The same reasoning is appropriate here. It
does not appear from the opinion where the tortfeasor died; yet, even
assuming that he died in Arizona, this would be the single contact
which would authorize resort to Arizona law to determine the effect of
his death on this cause of action. On the other hand, the tortfeasor
was domiciled in California; 2' his estate was being administered there
under California law; and the responsibilities of the defendant, as ad-
ministrator, were governed by the laws of California. Logic and reason
should permit the California court to apply its own law in deciding the
effect of the death of one of its citizens when, as here, the material con-
tacts associated with this event are with California.22
It would seem, in conclusion, that if the California court in the
instant case had viewed the death of the tortfeasor as an event separate
and apart from the acts giving rise to the cause of action in Arizona, it
might well have applied the substantive law of California in determining
the effect of that subsequent event. In this manner, the court would
have been able to reach the same decision without the unnecessary abuse
of the distinction between substance and procedure.
PAUL HARDIN III
WILLIAM KAELIN
20 STUMBERG, op. cit. sutpra note 13, at zo6, points out that "The common law
rule is that a cause of action for personal injury does not survive the death of the
plaintiff or defendant. Consequently, the cause of action, in states where the rule is in
force, is neither an asset of the estate of the injured party nor a liability of the estate
of the tortfeasor. Where statutory changes have been made, the effect has been to
make the cause of action an asset or a liability. Apparently, then, survivorship of
actions is more clearly akin to administration of estate than to tortious injuries. It
would seem therefore that since administration is generally determined by the de-
cedent's domiciliary law, that law might also be controlling here, with the effect of
the death of the plaintiff or of the defendant determined by the law of their respective
domicils." As to which law will govern a release, see 2 BEALE, op. cit. slepra note
3, at 12755 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 332, 355, 374. ('934).
"The significant role played by domicile in conflict of laws decisions is discussed
in GOODRICH, op. Sit. supra note z, C. z; see also HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE 409, 412
( 3th ed. 1924), listing domicile as one of the contact factors which may be resorted
to in determining which law is to govern in a conflict of laws case.
In Whitten v. Bennett, 77 Fed. 271 (C.C.D. Conn. 1896), in an action against
the administrator of the deceased tortfeasor for false imprisonment, the forum de-
termined survival by the law of the decedent's domicile rather than by the law of the
place where the tort occurred.
'A recent illustration of the "contacts" approach in solving choice of law prob-
lems in Barber v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 586, 63 N.E.zd 417, 423 (x945). This was
a suit to enforce a cognovit contained in a promissory note. Indiana, by statute, had in-
validated such confession of judgment provisions. In determining whether Indiana or
Illinois was to be considered the "place of making," the Indiana Supreme Court said:
"The court will consider all acts if the parties touching the transaction in relation to the
several states involved and will apply as the law governing the transaction the law of
that state with which the facts are in most intimate contact."
